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MULTILEVEL CYCLICALITY AND POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The article provides a comprehensive analysis of multi-level economic cyclicality and its effects on the political dynamics of public governance within the system of international relations. The starting premise is that economic development is not linear: it emerges from the interaction of waves of different durations and asymmetric shocks that alter growth trajectories, reallocate resources, and reshape states' institutional priorities. By distinguishing Kitchin short cycles, Juglar medium-term cycles, Kuznets «building» cycles, and Kondratieff long waves, the article substantiates that macroeconomic dynamics constitute a superposition of fluctuations, in which each «layer» has its own drivers, transmission channels, and political implications.

The study demonstrates that Kitchin short cycles (associated with fluctuations in inventories, demand, and short-term credit activity) increase an economy's sensitivity to policy errors and informational asymmetries, thereby triggering situational political responses and attempts at «quick fixes» through

fiscal or monetary measures. Juglar medium-term cycles (investment — credit cycles) generate more protracted phases of overheating and correction, during which the logic of fiscal discipline changes, the role of central banks becomes more salient, and issues of social justice intensify due to the uneven distribution of benefits and costs. Kuznets «building» cycles, linked to urbanisation, migration, demographic change, and long-horizon infrastructure investment, shape the spatial and social structure of development; consequently, they define the contours of territorial policy, regional inequality, labour-market dynamics, and models of the welfare state. Finally, Kondratieff long waves elevate the analysis to the level of structural technological shifts and global reallocations: within these waves, leading sectors expand or contract, innovation cores change, and global value chains are reconfigured — precisely where policymaking confronts questions of strategic competitiveness, economic sovereignty, and security autonomy.

A central analytical finding is that wars, financial crises, pandemics, and price and technological shocks do not merely «interrupt» cycles; rather, they deform their conventional logic by producing hybrid development trajectories. Under such conditions, classical cyclical regularities become desynchronised: short fluctuations are amplified by panic and information cascades, medium-term cycles by abrupt credit contractions or debt crises, and long waves by discontinuous technological breaks and geo-economic segmentation. This complicates forecasting and public decision-making, as the probability of policy error increases due to implementation lags, conflicting indicator signals, and competing objectives (price stability, employment, defence, and social protection).

In conclusion, the article justifies the use of cyclical analysis as a tool for indicative forecasting of periods of heightened global instability and as a methodological basis for designing more resilient decisions in state economic and security policy. Its value lies not in «predicting dates» but in the early

identification of high-risk configurations — when downturn phases of medium-term cycles coincide with structural breaks of long waves, while exogenous shocks accelerate political polarisation and weaken international regimes of cooperation.

Key words: *public governance, international relations, economic cyclicality, crisis, political instability, security policy, forecasting.*

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БАГАТОРІВНЕВА ЦИКЛІЧНІСТЬ І ПОЛІТИЧНА ДИНАМІКА ДЕРЖАВНОГО УПРАВЛІННЯ В СИСТЕМІ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИН

Статтю спрямовано на комплексний аналіз багаторівневої економічної циклічності та її впливу на політичну динаміку державного управління в системі міжнародних відносин. Вихідною тезою є положення про те, що економічний розвиток не має лінійної природи: він формується як взаємодія хвиль різної тривалості та асиметричних шоків, що змінюють траєкторію зростання, перерозподіляють ресурси й трансформують інституційні пріоритети держав. На основі розмежування коротких циклів Кітчина, середніх циклів Жюгляра, «будівельних» циклів Кузнеця та довгих хвиль Кондратьєва обґрунтовується, що макроекономічна динаміка являє собою суперпозицію

коливань, де кожен «шар» має власні причини, канали поширення й політичні наслідки.

У статті показано, що короткі цикли Кітчина (пов'язані з коливаннями запасів, попиту та короткострокової кредитної активності) підвищують чутливість економіки до управлінських помилок і інформаційних асиметрій, стимулюючи ситуативні політичні реакції та спроби «швидкого ремонту» через фіскальні чи монетарні заходи. Середні цикли Жюгляра (інвестиційно-кредитні) формують більш тривалі фази перегріву й корекції, у яких змінюється логіка бюджетної дисципліни, посилюється роль центральних банків та актуалізується питання соціальної справедливості через нерівномірний розподіл вигод і витрат. «Будівельні» цикли Кузнеця, пов'язані з урбанізацією, міграціями, демографією та довгими інфраструктурними інвестиціями, визначають просторову й соціальну структуру розвитку, а отже — задають контури територіальної політики, регіональної нерівності, ринку праці та моделей соціальної держави. Зрештою, довгі хвилі Кондратьєва виводять аналіз на рівень структурних технологічних зсувів і глобальних перерозподілів: у межах цих хвиль посилюються або слабшають провідні галузі, змінюються ядра інновацій, трансформуються глобальні ланцюги вартості — і саме тут політика стикається з питанням стратегічної конкурентоспроможності, економічного суверенітету та безпекової автономії.

Ключовим аналітичним висновком є те, що війни, фінансові кризи, пандемії, цінові та технологічні шоки не просто «переривають» цикли, а деформують їх звичайну логіку, формуючи комбіновані траєкторії розвитку. У таких умовах класичні циклічні закономірності «збиваються з ритму»: короткі коливання підсилюються панікою й інформаційними каскадами, середні — різкими кредитними стисканнями або борговими кризами, довгі — стрибкоподібними технологічними переломами та *геоекономічним розшаруванням. Це ускладнює прогнозування й ухвалення управлінських рішень, оскільки зростає ймовірність помилок через запізнення політики, суперечливі сигнали індикаторів і конкуренцію цілей (стабільність цін, зайнятість, оборона, соціальний захист).*

Узагальнюючи, обґрунтовується можливість застосування циклічного аналізу як інструменту орієнтовного прогнозування періодів підвищеної глобальної нестабільності та як методологічної основи для вироблення більш стійких рішень у сфері державної економічної й безпекової політики. Його цінність полягає не у «вгадуванні дат», а в ранньому розпізнаванні ризикових комбінацій: коли спадні фази середніх циклів збігаються зі структурними переломами довгих хвиль, а зовнішні шоки пришвидшують політичну поляризацію й послаблюють міжнародні режими співпраці.

Ключові слова: *державне управління, міжнародні відносини, економічна циклічність, криза, політична нестабільність, безпекова політика, прогнозування.*

The economic development of countries is cyclical in nature and is not a linear process of continuous growth. Classical and modern economic theory has established the idea that there are several types of economic cycles, which differ in duration, sources of formation, and impact on macroeconomic indicators. Economists distinguish short cycles lasting 2–3 years (*Kitchin cycles*), associated primarily with fluctuations in inventories and market conditions; medium cycles of 7–11 years (*Juglar cycles*), which reflect investment fluctuations and changes in business activity; longer cycles of 15–25 years (*so-called Kuznets construction or demographic cycles*), associated with structural shifts in the economy, urbanization, and population dynamics; and long waves of 40–60 years (*Kondratiev cycles*), which characterize profound technological and institutional transformations of economic systems. Changes in the economic situation occur as a result of disturbances in certain aspects of equilibrium: political instability in the country; discovery of new mineral resources; inflow of foreign investment; rapid scientific and technological progress [1]. This multi-level cyclicality creates a complex backdrop for economic policy decisions. Along with relatively regular cycles, which can be identified through statistical analysis of long-term data series, the trajectory of economic development is significantly influenced by shocks — unpredictable and often external events affecting the national economy. Such shocks include wars, financial crises, pandemics, sharp fluctuations in energy and raw material prices, natural disasters, technological breakthroughs, and large-scale political changes. They can cause sharp economic downturns or, conversely, short-term upturns, disrupting the usual rhythm of cycles and changing the phase of economic dynamics faster than would be expected from «*normal*» cyclical logic. As a result, combined trajectories are formed, where regular fluctuations of varying duration and one-off or serial shock events overlap, complicating the forecasting and management of economic processes.

In the current context of globalization and interdependence of national economies, the problem of combining cyclical fluctuations and shocks is becoming particularly relevant. Strengthening financial, trade, and technological ties contributes to faster transmission of crisis phenomena between countries and regions, making economic cycles less isolated within national borders. This creates additional challenges for public economic policy: the need to simultaneously take into account «*internal*» cyclical patterns of development and «*external*» shocks that can suddenly change the parameters of the economic environment. Under such conditions, the question of the extent to which traditional theoretical models of cycles can explain the real dynamics of macroeconomic indicators and how fiscal, monetary, and structural policy instruments can mitigate the negative effects of shocks becomes particularly important. Therefore, studying economic cycles in combination with analyzing shocks that disrupt their established course is an important prerequisite for understanding the nature of modern crises and the possibilities for overcoming them. The purpose of this study is to analyze how different types of economic cycles affect the political component of state development in the system of international relations, as well as internal development and public administration. Particular attention is paid to the example of Ukraine and other countries (the US, China, EU states) and how economic cycles affected the war in Ukraine in 2022 and beyond. The study first examines the theoretical foundations of economic cycles, then their impact on state policy and international relations.

Kitchin's short cycles (2–4 years). In the 1920s, English economist Joseph Kitchin described short-term fluctuations in economic activity lasting about 3–4 years. He linked these small cycles to the dynamics of global gold reserves, although modern science sees the reason in delays in the transmission of information and the response of firms to changes in the economic situation. The mechanism of the Kitchin cycle is that during an upturn, companies maximize their production capacity, producing a surplus of products. With a certain delay, companies receive a signal about market oversaturation (warehouses are overflowing) and reduce production, which causes a decline. After the sale of inventories, the cycle repeats. Thus, Kitchin cycles reflect the alternation of phases of recovery and slight recession caused by inventory management and decision-making lags.

Jouglar's medium cycles (7–11 years). In the 19th century, French economist Clément Jouglar described medium-term industrial cycles lasting approximately 7–11 years. In Juglar cycles, crises and upturns are caused not only by fluctuations in inventories and capacity utilization, as in Kitchin cycles, but also by fluctuations in the volume of investment in fixed capital. In other words, in addition to short-term lags, there are delays between investment decisions and the commissioning of new production facilities, as well as between a decline in demand and the closure of obsolete enterprises. These factors make the Juglar cycle longer. A typical cycle includes phases of recovery, boom (prosperity), recession (crisis), and depression (stagnation). Economic crises and recessions actually correspond to the downturn phase of the Juglar cycle. It is important to note that the depth of an average crisis depends on the long-term background — the phase of a longer cycle. In particular, the severity of the consequences of a given average cycle depends on which phase of Kondratiev's long wave it falls into. In other words, if a cyclical recession occurs during a period of general growth in the long wave, its consequences are milder, while during a period of global decline, even an average cycle can cause a deep crisis.

Kuznets' «construction» cycles (15–25 years). Simon Kuznets, an American economist of Ukrainian descent, discovered the existence of waves of economic activity with a period of about 15–25 years. They were named Kuznets cycles (rhythms) in his honor. Kuznets linked these medium-term waves to demographic processes, in particular, the scale of immigration and construction cycles, which is why these fluctuations were also called «*demographic*» or «*construction*» cycles. The essence is that periods of intense economic growth are accompanied by a construction boom, urbanization, and an increase in population density until the market becomes saturated with infrastructure. Modern researchers also view Kuznets' rhythms as technological or infrastructure cycles during which a massive renewal of basic technologies takes place. For example, major cycles in the real estate market (bubbles and housing price crashes) often coincide with a 15–20-year periodicity, which corresponds to Kuznets' cycles. Thus, these cycles reflect deeper structural changes in the economy — demographic waves and investments in long-term assets.

Kondratiev's historical long wave cycle (1800–1990), illustrating the ups and downs of the global economy, each of which is associated with the key technologies of its era. Long cycles (K – waves) last ~45–60 years and go through phases of boom (rise, prosperity) and decline (crisis, depression) before the start of a new wave of development. In the 1920s, Kondratiev described cyclical «*great waves*» in the modern global economy lasting about 48–55 years. Kondratiev identified long periods of rise and fall in prices for key commodities and overall economic activity associated with waves of technological innovation. Kondratiev cycles (also known as K-waves or supercycles) are characterized by alternating phases of expansion (boom, «*spring-summer*» of the economy) and stagnation and crisis (decline, «*autumn-winter*» of the economy) approximately once every half-century. Historically, five or six such waves have been identified in the literature, each of which coincided with epoch-making technological advances and socio-economic changes. For example, the first wave (late 18th – mid-19th centuries) was associated with the Industrial Revolution (textile manufacturing, steam engines), the second with the boom in railways and steelmaking at the end of the 19th century, the third with electrification and chemistry in the early 20th century, the fourth with the development of the automotive, oil, and electronics industries after World War II, and the fifth (roughly from the 1970s to the 2010s) with information technology and globalization. A number of economists believe that the world is entering a sixth wave (beginning in the 2000s), driven by genetic technologies, artificial intelligence, new energy sources, and solutions to environmental and medical problems. Long waves have a clear impact on the global system: periods of growth are characterized by rapid technological progress and relative stability, while Kondratiev's «*winter*» phases coincide with deep economic crises and are often accompanied by social upheavals and wars (more on this below).

All of the above cycles of varying duration overlap each other. Short Kitchin cycles repeat several times within a single Juglar cycle; in turn, several Juglar cycles make up one Kuznets wave, and two or three Kuznets waves can fall within one long Kondratiev wave. Accordingly, local peaks and troughs of shorter cycles can reinforce or weaken each other. Researchers note that the combined effect of all four cycles forms an integral development curve that fairly accurately describes the dynamics of global socio-economic progress. For example, the onset of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 coincided with the transition of the global economy to the «*winter*» phase of the fifth Kondratiev long wave, when the Juglar and Kuznets cycles were simultaneously in a depressive phase. This synchronization gave rise to a particularly deep and systemic crisis. On the other hand, during periods when short cycles enter a phase of growth against the backdrop of long-term growth, there is strong economic growth and relative political stability. Therefore, understanding multi-level cyclicality is key to analyzing not only economic but also political development processes.

Economic cycles have a significant impact on the political development of states and the system of international relations. Economic ups and downs create favorable or crisis conditions that affect the stability of governments, public sentiment, and foreign policy. However, «*cyclical fluctuations in business activity are not a phenomenon that arises in a free market, but rather the result of government intervention in business conditions aimed at lowering interest rates below the level at which they would be set by a free market*» [2]. Historical analysis shows that periods of global economic crisis are often accompanied by political instability, rising tensions, and conflicts, while prolonged upturns promote international cooperation and strengthen the existing order.

Firstly, medium-term economic crises (phases of decline in Juglar cycles, which recur approximately once a decade) often lead to changes in political course and power in individual states, which together affect the entire system of international relations [3]. A classic example is the Great Depression of the 1930s: a prolonged economic downturn caused the collapse of financial systems, mass unemployment, and social upheaval in many countries, which laid the groundwork for the rise of political extremism. Research confirms that the economic crisis of the 1930s galvanized radical movements — it was during the depression that extreme right-wing and left-wing regimes came to power in Europe. Ultimately, these processes undermined the collective security system and led to World War II. Similarly, the recent global financial crisis of 2008–2009 led to noticeable political shifts: in many Western countries, the influence of populist and extreme parties grew after 2008. Typically, in the five years following financial crashes, voters shift significantly to the right — support for far-right parties increases by an average of one-third, and the political spectrum becomes more radicalized. Yes, after the 2008 crisis, Europe experienced a «*rightward shift*»: new anti-elitist forces achieved success in elections, party systems fragmented, which made it difficult to form stable government coalitions. Political polarization and difficulties in governing the state became a direct consequence of economic turmoil — parliaments are fragmenting into a greater number of parties, government majorities are weakening, and the level of trust in traditional elites is falling [4]. At the same time, mass protests have become more frequent: statistics from 20 developed democracies show that the average number of strikes, anti-government demonstrations, and riots in the five years after the financial crisis has more than doubled compared to the pre-crisis period. All this also affects foreign policy: governments weakened by internal problems are prone to isolationism or aggressive rhetoric, and the effectiveness of international institutions is declining.

Secondly, Kondratiev's long cycles overlap with changes in the international order and hegemony. The theory of long waves has a clear geopolitical dimension: it is believed that each long wave correlates with a period of dominance of a particular great power and the corresponding world-system configuration. During the upward wave (expansion phase), leadership in the global economy is held by an innovative state (e.g., Britain in the 19th century or the United States in the second half of the 20th century), while in the downward phase («*winter*» of the cycle), the struggle for resources and markets intensifies, often leading to military-political conflicts and a change of leadership. Research by J. Goldstein [5] (1988) and other scholars of military history points to the existence of approximately 50-year «*military cycles*» that are similar in frequency to economic K-waves. According to this hypothesis, world wars or similar large-scale conflicts erupt at the turning point of a long wave, when the old model of development has exhausted itself and the new one has not yet become dominant. Thus, the first half of the 20th century — the time of the decline of the third long wave — was marked by two world wars that radically reshaped the international order. The Cold War (the period after World War II) is seen as a phase of confrontation between superpowers within the fourth wave, after which, in the late 1980s, there was a brief phase of US hegemony. Interestingly, the global crisis of 2007–2008 coincided with the beginning of the end of American unilateral hegemony: researchers note that 2007–2008 were turning points — the dismantling of the old unipolar world order and the «*renaissance of history*» began after a period of relative stability. In fact, the world entered a period of regrouping of forces — against the backdrop of the financial crisis, new centers of influence emerged (China, the revival of Russia's geopolitical ambitions, etc.), which laid the foundation for the current multipolar tensions [6].

Thirdly, short-term economic fluctuations (*Kitchen cycles*) can also influence politics, albeit indirectly. They often coincide with political cycles in democratic states, such as election cycles. Governments often try to smooth out or delay minor downturns before elections (the «*political business cycle*» phenomenon) in order to gain voter support [7]. However, even if a short recession coincides with an election year, it can lead to a change in power. An interesting fact: it has been analyzed that in the second half of the 20th century and early 21st century, the change of US president approximately every 8 years coincided with the phases of the Juglar cycle. In other words, the economic downturns of the 1970s, early 1980s, early 1990s, 2000s, 2008, and 2020 coincided with elections in which the opposition party came to power (from Carter to Reagan, from Bush Sr. to Clinton, from Bush Jr. to Obama, from Trump to Biden, etc.). This trend shows that even a small cyclical crisis undermines support for the current government and changes the country's domestic political course. «*The most powerful crisis-generating factor in the political system is the system of power distribution*» [8].

Collectively, these changes in leading countries are reflected on the international stage — new leaders review foreign policy, adjust commitments in alliances, and initiate or cancel international agreements. Thus, economic cycles set the pace for political cycles and processes: economic upturns usually contribute to the continuation of the status quo and the strengthening of cooperation between states, while crises, on the contrary, lead to a redistribution of influence, conflicts, and the search for new models of development.

Thus, analysis of various types of economic cycles — from short-term fluctuations in the economic situation to Kondratiev's long waves — convincingly demonstrates their profound impact on political dynamics within states and the transformation of the international order. Phases of economic decline create fertile ground for the radicalization of society, the growth of populist and extreme political forces, increased protest activity, and the weakening of traditional elites. In the long term, this is accompanied by a shift in the centers of global hegemony, a regrouping of forces, and an increased risk of major military and political conflicts. Even relatively small recessions that coincide with election cycles can lead to changes in government and adjustments in the foreign policy courses of leading states. Thus, economic cyclicality not only reflects the internal patterns of development of economic systems, but also sets the pace for the evolution of political regimes and the architecture of international security, opening up opportunities for the use of cyclical analysis as a tool for forecasting periods of increased global instability.

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